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INTRODUCTION
In this octocentenary year of Magna Carta, the title of this
Article might seem odd. Why ask about our plans for 2017? Baroness
Miller of Chilthorne Domer posed the same question to the
government of the United Kingdom in the House of Lords on June 4,
2015:
To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they will mark the
800th anniversary in 2017 of the granting of the Charter of the
Forest in a similar way to that in which the Magna Carta is
being marked this year.2
The government took two weeks to formulate an answer,
delivered by Lord Faulks on June 18, 2015:
2. See 763 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2015) WA4 (Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer)
(UK), http://qnadailyreport.blob.core.windows.net/qnadailyreportxml/Written-QuestionsAnswers-Statements-Daily-Report-Lords-2015-06-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP8Z-PKWU];
Charter of the Forest: Written Question—HL272, U.K. PARLIAMENT (June 4, 2015)
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements
/written-question/Lords/2015-06-04/HL272/ [http://perma.cc/W9RK-PT39].
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The Charter of the Forest was an important document in its
own right when it was issued by Henry III in 1217 at the same
time as a re-issue of Magna Carta. The Charter re-established
rights of access to the forest for free men that had been eroded
over the time. However, although the provisions of the Charter
of the Forest remained in force for a number of centuries, it has
not enjoyed the same lasting and worldwide recognition as
Magna Carta, which has had an enduring significance on the
development of the concept of the rule of law. Consequently,
while the Government is actively supporting the celebration of
the 800[th] anniversary of Magna Carta this year, it has no plans
to mark and celebrate the 800th anniversary of the Charter of
the Forest.3
At one time, the “Charter of the Forest,” or the “Forest
Charter,”4 enjoyed a status equal to its indispensable partner, Magna
Carta. Indeed one could not be understood without the other, and the
failure to remember this fact, either now or in 2017, leaves
impoverished our understanding of Magna Carta’s legacy. Why?
In failing to consider the Forest Charter and Magna Carta
together, we lose the former’s commitment to community and
obligations that balances the latter’s legacy of individual rights. The
source of this impoverishment originates in the association of Magna
Carta with freedom, or more accurately constitutional freedom, or
even more accurately American constitutional freedom.5 And the
adjectives “personal” and “individual” often qualify this
understanding of freedom. In other words, those aware of Magna
Carta likely view it through American lenses,6 and those lenses focus
an image of freedom that carries a decidedly individualistic parallax.
3. 763 Parl Deb HL, supra note 2.
4. While the literature and sources provided herein use the terms “Charter of the
Forest” and “Forest Charter” interchangeably, unless quoting another source directly, this
Article uses the latter.
5. Magna Carta, while frequently adverted to by lawyers, is far less relied upon
judicially in jurisdictions other than the United States. For example, while Magna Carta is
frequently used to support arguments based upon freedom, the Australian judiciary has
often limited its application. See David Clark, The Legacy of Magna Carta, 37 LAW SOC’Y
BULL. 10, 12 (2015) (describing one Australian jurist’s suggested treatment of Magna
Carta “as an expression of the common law . . . capable of being adapted to modern
arrangements”). However, more recently Australian courts have increasingly relied on
Magna Carta for support. See David Clark, The Icon of Liberty: The Status and Role of
Magna Carta in Australian and New Zealand Law, 24 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 866, 868
(2000), [hereinafter Clark, The Icon of Liberty].
6. See generally NICHOLAS VINCENT, MAGNA CARTA: THE FOUNDATION OF
FREEDOM 1215–2015 (2015) (explaining how Magna Carta is often viewed through
American lenses). This is true even in the United Kingdom. See, e.g., DAVID STARKEY,
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The individualistic impression of freedom found in Magna Carta
emerges from its famous chapter 39 (29 in the definitive 1225 Magna
Carta7), which, as understood today, contains four important concepts
that form the core of modern American constitutional freedom:
habeas corpus, the prohibition of torture, trial by jury, and the rule of
law. Yet a fifth significant individual freedom—frequently mentioned
in modern American case law, yet so ubiquitous in our social
vernacular as to go virtually unnoticed in our modern world—also
emerges from chapter 29: property.
In a string of decisions stretching back almost to the antebellum
period, the Supreme Court of the United States found, and continues
to find in chapter 29, the origins of the protection for property.8 This
appropriation of Magna Carta’s legacy served the early republic in its
pursuit of capitalism as its foundational economic creed; indeed,
American law enlisted Magna Carta to protect individual property
rights in almost anything, including, sadly, even the ownership of
human beings in the form of slavery.9 And it is in this seemingly
unbounded potential of Magna Carta to support the protection of
property even in the most extreme and abhorrent circumstances that

MAGNA CARTA: THE TRUE STORY BEHIND THE CHARTER 149–55 (2015) (comparing
and contrasting the celebration and living nature of Magna Carta in England and the
United States). In the United Kingdom, Magna Carta continues to be seen as
“representing key values in the legal system” and as a “presumption in favour of liberty.”
See Clark, The Icon of Liberty, supra note 5, at 890–91; see also William D. Guthrie,
Magna Carta, 10 BENCH & B. 300, 306–07 (1916) (characterizing Magna Carta as
“guaranteeing the fundamental rights and liberties of the individual”).
7. The chapter numbers used throughout are from the Magna Carta of 1225, which
became definitive. See DAVID CARPENTER, MAGNA CARTA 429 (2015) (“The texts of
1225 Magna Carta and Charter of the Forest became definitive. Henry III, Edward I and
their successors never issued new versions of the Charters. They simply confirmed those of
1225. It is thus the 1225 Charters, or what is left of them after various repeals, which are
on the statute book today. The mere existence of the Charters did not, however, ensure
either their enforcement or their continued relevance.”).
8. See, e.g., Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998) (“Since the time of
our early explanations of due process, we have understood the core of the concept to be
the protection against arbitrary action . . . .”) (referencing Magna Carta); Bank of
Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. 235, 244 (1819) (“As to the words from Magna Charta . . . the
good sense of mankind has at length settled down to this: that they were intended to
secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government,
unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice.”); see
also BERNARD H. SIEGAN, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 3 (2001) (describing Supreme Court decisions beginning in
1987 involving land use cases that are “remarkably consistent with earlier interpretations”
of property rights influenced by Magna Carta).
9. PETER LINEBAUGH, THE MAGNA CARTA MANIFESTO: LIBERTIES AND
COMMONS FOR ALL 187 (2007).
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the failure to recognize the Forest Charter leaves impoverished
Magna Carta’s legacy.
For Magna Carta’s legacy contains so much more than merely
the protection of property in the hands of the individual or individual
freedom at the expense of the freedom of others. Indeed, one of the
great themes emerging from Magna Carta, when one clears away its
uses in American law, is the recognition of the community and
obligation towards others as a balance to the protection of the
individual and individual rights. But the process of clearing away
Magna Carta’s use in American law requires a reunion of Magna
Carta with its historical partner, the Forest Charter. In four Parts, this
Article seeks to reunite these two great partners through the telling of
two stories—one, the well-known story of Magna Carta’s place in how
we understand property and the other, the entirely forgotten story of
the Forest Charter’s balancing of Magna Carta’s first story of
property. While we commemorate the first story in 2015, the other
lies hidden in the mists of time.
Part I, “Magna Carta as Individual and Rights,” tells the first,
well-known story. This story, emerging from chapter 29 and told
successively by commentators and judges, supports an understanding
of property that focuses on the individual. The story can be succinctly
stated: the individual has self-regarding or self-seeking choice in
relation to the use of goods and resources, and that power of choice
ought not, save in exceptional circumstances, be interfered with by
others, including, and sometimes especially, by the state. In short, this
story tells us that property is “individualist-absolutist”: individualist in
the exercise of rights and absolutist as concerns state interference
with the exercise of those rights.
Why does the story matter? Because so much theorizing about
property comes from U.S. Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
jurisprudence, property today is often thought of as an echo of this
first story. Put another way, this story supports the modern liberal
conception of property, and the liberal conception permits a great
many choices to be made by individuals, both natural and legal, about
goods and resources, none of which take account of the way that
those choices might affect others or the wider community. This story,
largely created, and certainly encouraged and perpetuated by
American law, allows Magna Carta’s enlistment in defense of such
choices. This is problematic because those choices constitute an
overlooked aspect of many of the problems we face in modern global
life. Part I recounts the role of such choices in just one of many global
problems: anthropogenic climate change.
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But this first story, like the conception of property it is said to
support, represents only half the story—for property is in fact
relational, an understanding of property that Magna Carta’s legacy
can also support in its second story. And so Part II tells that second,
forgotten story: the story of the Forest Charter. Yet it is not easy—the
fading from memory of the Forest Charter’s role in the legacy of
Magna Carta is almost complete. To take but two examples of this
fading, over the summer of 2015, while in the United Kingdom, I
visited the British Library and Salisbury Cathedral, which together
hold three of the four original copies of Magna Carta 1215; both had
major exhibitions for the eight hundredth anniversary. The British
Library exhibition mentioned the Forest Charter in just one display,
while Salisbury Cathedral’s exhibition made no mention at all.
Indeed, if one was not aware of it, one could easily have left both
exhibitions without ever knowing that the Forest Charter was at one
time the co-equal “sister” of Magna Carta, and at the very least a
central component of its legacy. At some point in the last eight
hundred years, the Forest Charter’s story was lost; why it was lost
may itself be lost to us today. In reuniting the Forest Charter with the
first story, we rediscover a long-forgotten legacy of Magna Carta for
property.
What then has been lost in our forgetting of the Forest Charter?
Simply this: community and obligation—the balance of the individual
and rights—which in essence forms the core of a relational
understanding of property. In other words, historically, Magna Carta
had its own balance—the Forest Charter. In losing that important
counterbalance to the first story, much of what American law tells us
about the support Magna Carta gives to the modern, liberal,
individualist-absolutist conception of property is misleading. It is
misleading because it leaves out the balance of community and
obligation to the community and others. It misleads because it denies
much of what we know about property today. It is not solely about
the individual exercising rights in a self-regarding way; it is also about
relationship, which means that it is about considering the other, the
community, and the obligations that we owe towards the other and to
community in exercising the rights conferred by property. We forget
both documents, read together, at the peril of losing a fundamental
component of Magna Carta’s legacy for property. The whole story of
Magna Carta’s legacy for property includes both stories.
Part III offers three concluding reflections on what the Forest
Charter’s twin notions of community and obligation could mean for
our contemporary understanding of property. With the proliferation

94 N.C. L. REV. 1431 (2016)

2016]

MAGNA CARTA & THE FOREST CHARTER

1437

of contemporary theorizing about property, the reunion of these two
great historical partners is both necessary and overdue for two
reasons. First, it dispels misconceptions about Magna Carta’s true
legacy. Second, in rediscovering the community and obligation that
balances Magna Carta’s focus on the individual and rights, we allow
its legacy to tell an entirely different story, one much more in keeping
with its original public meaning about the nature of property. This
alternative image of private property may serve as the foundation for
a new perception of the environment and our place within it,
responding to the causes and ameliorating the effects of climate
change. Part IV concludes, suggesting that a new metaphor calls us to
reassess Magna Carta’s story of property. We have no better
opportunity to reassess this story than with the eight-hundredth
anniversary of the Forest Charter in 2017.
I. THE FIRST STORY OF PROPERTY: MAGNA CARTA AS INDIVIDUAL
AND RIGHTS
A. The Popular Perception
American law tells the first story, which enlists Magna Carta’s
legacy in support of the modern liberal conception of property—a
conception that focuses on individual liberty and freedom as the core
of property. The story’s origins lie in those chapters of Magna Carta
that appear to guarantee property rights.10 Chapters 19 and 21 read:
19. No constable or his bailiff shall take the corn or other
chattels of anyone who is not of the vill where the castle is
situated unless he pays on the spot in cash for them or can delay
payment by arrangement with the seller; if the seller is of that
vill [then] he shall pay within forty days.
....
21. No sheriff, or bailiff of ours, or other person shall take
anyone’s horses or carts for transport work unless he pays for
them at the old-established rates, namely at ten pence a day for

10. The two classic and definitive authorities on Magna Carta are by J. C. Holt and
William Sharp McKechnie. J. C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 9–12 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the
history of Magna Carta); WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A
COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 3–36 (2d ed. 1914) (providing a
chapter-by-chapter commentary). The first complete, chapter-by-chapter commentary on
Magna Carta since Holt is David Carpenter’s Magna Carta. See generally CARPENTER,
supra note 7.
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a cart with two horses and fourteen pence a day for a cart with
three horses. No demesne cart of any ecclesiastical person or
knight or of any lady shall be taken by the aforesaid bailiffs.
Neither we nor our bailiffs nor others will take, for castles or
other works of ours, timber which is not ours, except with the
agreement of him whose timber it is.11
A plain reading of these provisions attests to their narrow scope and
application largely to agricultural products and related equipment.12
Chapter 29, though, the most famous provision of Magna Carta,
bolsters these provisions to form the core of the first story:
29. No free man shall in future be arrested or imprisoned or
disseised of his freehold, liberties or free customs, or outlawed
or exiled or victimised in any other way, neither will we attack
him or send anyone to attack him except by the lawful
judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. To no one will
we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay right or justice.13
Still, notwithstanding its broader scope, chapter 29 hardly seems to
provide the sort of lofty language we might expect Magna Carta to
contain if it stood as a strong defense of private property.14
Where, we might ask, is the clear protection of individual
freedom, autonomy, and liberty as against the predations of others,
including the state in almost any form and any circumstance? Where
is the language commensurate with the popular perception of Magna
Carta’s place in the American understanding of constitutional
freedom, indeed, as part of the foundation of Western civilization?15
If Magna Carta supports that sort of protection and prohibition, we
might expect it to read more like the Fifth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, for which it is often said to form one of the background
principles:
No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation.16

11. MAGNA CARTA chs. 19, 21 (1225), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE
app. I at 428–29 (Daniel B. Magraw et al. eds., 2014).
12. See R.H. Helmholz, Magna Carta, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 333–34 (1999).
13. MAGNA CARTA ch. 29 (1225), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF
LAW, supra note 11, app. I at 429.
14. For an overview of the strong defence that has emerged from the popular use of
chapter 29, see LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 170–91.
15. Id. at 22, 192.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

OF LAW
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While we might expect to find language more like that of the Fifth
Amendment, in fact it simply is not there. Rather, there is only a
public perception of its presence. Notwithstanding the lack of lofty
language, Magna Carta’s popular perception as a general protection
of rights (including property) survives as both myth and icon, at once
characterized by ambiguity, mystery, nonsense, and even reification.17
Over time, though, the popular perception has become the story
told by American law about Magna Carta’s support for individualistabsolutist property. It is hard to say which came first, the perception
or the story; either way, the two have fused into one narrative about
Magna Carta and liberty. Thus, while one searches in vain for the
strong protection of private property in clear and unambiguous terms
that might meet the expectations created by the popular perception,
the story of that support is told in the American jurisprudence,
repeatedly, if selectively,18 throughout the history of the republic.
How did this American story develop?
B.

The Individualist-Absolutist Story

In England, the story that Magna Carta prohibits the taking of
property without just compensation can be traced at least to the time
of the Stuarts,19 at which time “[w]henever an excess of class
17. Id.
18. Consider Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), a Takings Clause case
that has produced more opprobrium and legislative reaction than perhaps all other takings
cases combined, but which mentions Magna Carta not once; although, as we will see,
mention of the Forest Charter would certainly have been appropriate, and helpful, in
countering the story of strong property protection provided by Magna Carta in support of
the outcome in Kelo. For a discussion of the opprobrium surrounding Kelo, see generally
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY (2008). For further commentary on Kelo, see
ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS
OF EMINENT DOMAIN (2015) (criticizing the deferential standard the Kelo Court seemed
to adopt for analyzing “public use”); Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the
Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009) (describing the response of state
legislatures in limiting eminent domain power for economic development by legislation
and arguing that such reforms are unlikely to be an effective substitute for a clear
constitutional rule against such takings).
19. The Stuarts were the members of a royal house of Scotland, the House of Stuart,
which inherited the realms of Elizabeth I of England in 1603 when James VI of Scotland
became James I of England by virtue of the Union of the Crowns. See Jenny Wormald,
James VI and I (1566–1625), King of Scotland, England, and Ireland, OXFORD DICTIONARY
NAT’L BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/14592?docPos=3 [https://perma
.cc/ETQ7-CKYA (staff-uploaded archive)]. Four Stuart kings ruled the British Isles—James
I, Charles I and II, and James II—with an interregnum of parliamentary rule lasting from
1649 to 1660 as a result of the English Civil War. Kings and Queens of England & Britain,
HISTORIC UK, http://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/KingsQueensofBritain/ [https://
perma.cc/R47Q-MA4L]. Following the Glorious Revolution in 1688, Mary II and Anne
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legislation and attacks on private property shall lead Englishmen to
place checks and restraints upon the power of temporary majorities,
so as more effectively to protect personal and property rights . . . then
the stirring battle-cry will again be Magna Carta[.]”20 And at least in
its popular perception, Magna Carta served as a source of the liberty
supporting property, which continues to appear in English law and
those jurisdictions that trace their lineage to the common law
system.21 One of the most recent invocations of this argument comes
from Australia, where claimants successfully argued that the public
right to fish in tidal waters, subject to abrogation by clear words of
Parliament, derives from Magna Carta.22 In short then, Magna Carta
is also seen as a guarantee of Anglo-Australian private property in
the popular imagination.23
The story as it is found in English law, however, is nothing like
the individualist-absolutist version championed by American law.24
True, the link between Magna Carta and the American story can be
traced to chapter 39 and the property-alluding provisions of chapters
21, 28, 30, and 31; but from that tenuous link has grown the cult of
Magna Carta as a champion of individual and absolutist property.25
And while this cult emerged very early in the history of the republic
as a key symbol of individual rights and freedoms against
government, it was not through any sense of lofty, universal goals
concerning the liberty of all people, but from the notorious
understanding of liberty that not only countenanced, but facilitated
that abhorrent form of property found in slavery.26 In recounting the

ruled as Stuart queens. See W. A. Speck, Mary II (1662–1694), Queen of England, Scotland,
and Ireland, OXFORD DICTIONARY NAT’L BIOGRAPHY, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view
/article/18246?docPos=1 [https://perma.cc/W3HG-Y5W4]. Due to Catholic ties, under the
terms of the 1701 Act of Settlement, 12 and 13 Will. 3 c. 2, the Crown passed from the House
of Stuart to the House of Hanover in 1714. See House of Hanover, ENCYCLOPÆDIA
BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/topic/House-of-Hanover [http://perma.cc/WB3FZ53K]. When used here, “Stuarts” refers to the period of the first four Stuart kings of
England.
20. Guthrie, supra note 6, at 306–07.
21. Clark, The Icon of Liberty, supra note 5, at 890–91.
22. See Arnhemland Aboriginal Land Trust v Director of Fisheries (NT) (2000) 170
ALR 1, 21 (Austl.).
23. Clark, The Icon of Liberty, supra note 5, at 868, 887.
24. LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 184 (noting that “[t]he key to understanding Magna
Carta in the United States is private property”).
25. Id. at 179.
26. Id. For a full account of the role of property in the context of American slavery,
see generally MARK V. TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V.
MANN IN HISTORY AND LITERATURE (2003) and ALAN WATSON, SLAVE LAW IN THE
AMERICAS (1989).
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American story, it must be remembered that Magna Carta has been
held up as a paragon of liberty even in the face of such egregious
affronts to that very concept found in slavery.
Although the references are sparse, the American story has its
origins in the antebellum period. One of the earliest mentions of
Magna Carta in support of property in the United States came in the
1829 decision, Wilkinson v. Leland,27 in which the Supreme Court of
the United States wrote that the “rights of personal liberty and of
property . . . [are] the great principles of Magna Charta[.]”28 During
the pre-Civil War era, the Court also cited Magna Carta in Runyan v.
Lessee of Coster29 and Perin v. Carey30 to support mortmain and
possession in perpetuity.31
The Reconstruction Amendments to the Constitution, however,
gave renewed vitality to the story, solidifying its support of the
individualist-absolutist conception of property. The foundation of this
support is found in Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.32
The Amendment has been interpreted as “incorporating” the Bill of
Rights, which originally applied only to the federal government, so as
to apply to the states as well.33 For example, in Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago,34 the Supreme Court used the
Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the Fifth Amendment
protection of property so as to apply to the states.35 In 1947, Justice
Hugo Black summarized the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment—

27. 27 U.S. 627 (1829).
28. Id. at 657.
29. 39 U.S. 122 (1840).
30. 65 U.S. 465 (1861).
31. See Perin, 65 U.S. at 498; Runyan, 39 U.S. at 124.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment’s confrontation guarantee was, like other constitutional guarantees in the Bill
of Rights, incorporated as to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
34. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
35. Id. at 236. Professor Peter Linebaugh argues that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
incorporation of the Fifth Amendment against the states comprises “the most decisive
legal translation from Magna Carta into American law.” See LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at
170–91.
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intended to overcome the effects of slavery—in relation to property
as
aimed at restraining and checking the powers of wealth and
privilege. It was to be a charter of liberty for human rights
against property rights. The transformation has been rapid and
complete. It operates to-day to protect the rights of property to
the detriment of the rights of man. It has become the Magna
Charta of accumulated and organized capital.36
In at least fifteen cases since the Civil War Amendments, the
Supreme Court has explained how the phrase “due process of law”
stems from the phrase “law of the land,” itself used by Edward III to
conclude chapter 39 in the 1354 confirmation of Magna Carta.37 For
instance, in Ex parte Milligan,38 “the Supreme Court named the
sources of [American] law as the Constitution, acts of Congress,
Magna Carta, common law, and natural justice.”39 In Bates v.
Brown,40 the Court cited Blackstone’s opinion that private property
receives more protection in Magna Carta than in the Petition of
Right.41 In Reagan v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust Co.,42 the Court held
that “[a]ll the original States undertook to secure the inviolability of
private property. This they did, either by extracting and adopting, in
terms, the famous 39th article of Magna Charta[.]”43 Carstairs v.
Cochran44 held that:
Every system of law provides that every man shall be protected
in the enjoyment of his property, and that it shall not be taken
from him without just compensation. The earliest constitutions,
in Magna Charta, guarantee that no freeman shall be disseized
of his freehold but by the judgment of his peers or by the law of
the land.45
And, in Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales,46 the Court wrote that
“[w]ithout the guaranty of ‘due process’ the right of private property
cannot be said to exist[.]”47 Together, the reliance placed by
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 84 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 186 (citation omitted).
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 179; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 80.
72 U.S. 710 (1867).
See id. at 715; LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 184.
154 U.S. 362 (1894).
LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 184; Reagan, 154 U.S. at 379.
193 U.S. 10 (1904).
Id. at 11–12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
230 U.S. 139 (1913).
Id. at 161.
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American courts on Magna Carta in developing the meaning of due
process within the Fourteenth Amendment added weight to its
authority as a source of the American concept of personal freedom,
which in turn has become central to the concept of private property.
Perhaps the clearest statement using Magna Carta to support
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protections of property comes
from this 1880 statement of the Michigan Supreme Court in City of
Detroit v. Detroit & Howell Plank Road Co.48:
[T]he right of the government to take from either individuals or
corporations any property which they may rightfully have
acquired. In the most arbitrary times such an act was recognized
as pure tyranny, and it has been forbidden in England ever
since Magna Charta, and in this country always. It is immaterial
in what way the property was lawfully acquired; whether by
labor in the ordinary avocations of life, by gift or descent, or by
making profitable use of a franchise granted by the State: it is
enough that it has become private property, and it is then
protected by the “law of the land.”49
Though only a pronouncement of a state supreme court, this
summarization of the American story draws together not only the
individualist-absolutist understanding of property originating in
chapter 39 of Magna Carta but also the protection of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments against uncompensated takings of property.
Yet, one might wonder about Magna Carta’s role in 1880 and whether
it retains any relevance today. A story last heard in 1880 would hardly
be one worth remembering.
Not only is the story remembered, but it continues to be told; the
most recent retelling came in the midst of the octocentenary year,
demonstrating Magna Carta’s status in the American pantheon of
property. Horne v. Department of Agriculture,50 handed down by the
U.S. Supreme Court in June 2015, involved the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, which “authorizes the Secretary
of Agriculture to promulgate ‘marketing orders’ to help maintain
stable markets for particular agricultural products.”51 The marketing

48. 43 Mich. 140 (1880).
49. Id. at 148; see also Marx v. Hanthorn, 148 U.S. 172, 183 (1893); Late Corp. of
Church of Jesus Christ v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 36 (1890); Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S.
161, 164 (1888); Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 372–73 (1884)
(Field, J., dissenting); Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 737–38 (1878); Transp. Co. v.
Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878); LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 189 n.14.
50. 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).
51. Id. at 2424.
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order for raisins established a Raisin Administrative Committee that
imposed a reserve requirement.52 This requirement forced growers to
set aside a certain percentage of their crop for the government, free of
charge, and which the government used by any means consistent with
the purposes of the program.53 This reserve was used to stabilize the
raisin market.54 After subtracting the government’s administration
expenses, the net proceeds were distributed to the raisin growers.55 In
2002 to 2003, the government “ordered raising growers to turn over
forty-seven percent of their crop[;]” in 2003 to 2004, the requirement
decreased to thirty percent.56
The Horne family were raisin growers who refused to set aside
any raisins for the government on the ground that the reserve
requirement was an unconstitutional taking of their property for
public use without just compensation.57 The government fined the
Hornes the fair market value of the raisins as well as additional civil
penalties for their failure to obey the raisin marketing order.58 The
Hornes sought relief in federal court, arguing that the reserve
requirement was an unconstitutional taking of their property under
the Fifth Amendment.59 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the reserve requirement was not a taking.60
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court held in an eight-toone decision that the raisin reserve requirement was a taking, thus
requiring the government to pay the farmers just compensation.61
Thus, any net proceeds the raisin growers received from the sale of
the raisin reserve goes to the amount of compensation they have
received for that taking—it did not mean, however, that the raisins
have not been appropriated for public use. Nor could the government
make raisin growers relinquish their property without just
compensation as a condition of selling their raisins in interstate
commerce.
Horne’s holding regarding the taking of personal property in
raisins need not concern us here. What is of interest and importance
in the current context is the Court’s reliance upon Magna Carta as
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2425–26.
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linked to the constitutional prohibition of takings of property without
just compensation. A link, the Court says, that stretches over the
course of American history.62 In the decision, Chief Justice Roberts
wrote that the application of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to
both real and personal property was a
principle [that] goes back at least 800 years to Magna Carta,
which specifically protected agricultural crops from
uncompensated takings. Clause 28 [19] of that charter forbade
any “constable or other bailiff” from taking “corn or other
provisions from any one without immediately tendering money
therefor, unless he can have postponement thereof by
permission of the seller.”63
And he continued that:
The colonists brought the principles of Magna Carta with them
to the New World, including that charter’s protection against
uncompensated takings of personal property. In 1641, for
example, Massachusetts adopted its Body of Liberties,
prohibiting “mans Cattel or goods of what kinde soever” from
being “pressed or taken for any publique use or service, unlesse
it be by warrant grounded upon some act of the generall Court,
nor without such reasonable prices and hire as the ordinarie
rates of the Countrie do afford.” Virginia allowed the seizure of
surplus “live stock, or beef, pork, or bacon” for the military, but
only upon “paying or tendering to the owner the price so
estimated by the appraisers.” And South Carolina authorized
the seizure of “necessaries” for public use, but provided that
“said articles so seized shall be paid for agreeable to the prices
such and the like articles sold for on the ninth day of October
last.”64
Using this background to the Takings Clause as support, Chief Justice
Roberts argued that the attitude of early Americans up to the time of
the Revolutionary War, and since, has continued to “bridle[] at
appropriations of their personal property”65 in the same way as did
the Europeans who brought Magna Carta’s principles with them to
North America in the seventeenth century.66

62. In Horne, Chief Justice Roberts cited cases spanning 120 years. See id. at 2425–27.
63. Id. at 2426 (citations omitted).
64. Id. (citations omitted).
65. Id. (citations omitted).
66. See id. (“The principle reflected in the [Takings] Clause goes back at least 800
years to Magna Carta, which specifically protected agricultural crops from uncompensated
takings.”).
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Horne provides a clear contemporary statement of Magna
Carta’s story of individualist-absolutist property in American law. But
why does it matter that Magna Carta has been taken to stand for an
individualist-absolutist conception of property? Why does it matter
that we tell a different, alternative story about Magna Carta, one that
includes the community and obligation and looks to—indeed,
requires—the Forest Charter? The answer to that question comes in
two parts: the link to liberalism and the harm that follows. This Part
considers each in turn.
C.

The Link to the Liberal Conception of Property

Without expressly saying so, the Supreme Court uses Magna
Carta’s legacy to support what has come to be known as the
Hohfeldian (after Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld67) “bundle of rights”
picture of property68 or the liberal conception of property.69 The
liberal conception has become the dominant conception of property
internationally in law, jurisprudence, and legal theory.70 To what
exactly, then, does the Supreme Court link Magna Carta when it tells
its individualist-absolutist story of property? In order to answer that
question, we need first to understand something about modern
liberalism and the place of property within it.
Modern liberalism concerns itself with the establishment and
maintenance of a political and legal order that, among other things,
secures to the “liberal individual” the freedom to choose a “life
project,” the values and ends of a preferred way of life.71 Having
made this choice, in order for life to have meaning, the individual
requires some ability to have control over and to make use of goods

67. For the Hohfeldian background to liberal property, see generally WESLEY
NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 65 (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923).
68. On the bundle of rights concept of property, see J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of
Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 712 (1996).
69. See Paul Babie, Choices That Matter: Three Propositions on the Individual, Private
Property and Anthropogenic Climate Change, 22 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 323,
332 (2010) [hereinafter Babie, Choices That Matter]; Paul Babie, Idea, Sovereignty, Ecocolonialism, and the Future: Four Reflections on Private Property and Climate Change, 19
GRIFFITH L. REV. 527, 527 (2010) [hereinafter Babie, Idea, Sovereignty, Eco-colonialism,
and the Future]; Paul Babie, The Spatial: A Forgotten Dimension of Property, 50 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 323, 342 (2013) [hereinafter Babie, The Spatial].
70. See Babie, Choices That Matter, supra note 69, at 353; Babie, Idea, Sovereignty,
Eco-colonialism, and the Future, supra note 69, at 530–31; Babie, The Spatial, supra note
69, at 338.
71. See LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 1 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984); see also J. W.
HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 277–300 (2d ed. 2004).
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and resources. Private property is liberalism’s means of ensuring that
individuals enjoy choice over goods and resources so as to allow them
to fulfill their life project.72
The liberal conception of private property is, then, in simple
terms, a “bundle” of legal relations (or rights) created, conferred, and
enforced by the state through law, between people as to the control of
goods and resources.73 At a minimum, these rights typically include
use, exclusivity, and disposition.74 For example, one can use a car (or
any other tangible or intangible good, resource, or item of social
wealth) to the exclusion of all others and may dispose of it as she sees
fit. The holder may exercise these rights in any way she sees fit to suit
her personal preferences and desires. This ability to suit ones’ own
preferences is referred to by a number of phrases, including selfseekingness, preference satisfaction, or agenda-setting.75 Or, to follow
more closely the language of liberal theory, rights are the shorthand
for saying that individuals enjoy choice about the control and use of
goods and resources in accordance with and to give meaning to a
chosen life project.76
Whatever rights that may be included in the liberal bundle,
however, they exist only as a product of relationship between
individuals. This is significant, for it focuses our attention on the fact
that where there is a right (choice) to do something, there is a
corresponding duty (a lack of choice) to refrain from interfering with
the interest protected by the right.77 Rights would clearly be
meaningless if this were not so. As concerns any particular good or
resource, then, the liberal individual holds choice while all others (the
community, society) are burdened with a lack of it. C. Edwin Baker
summarized the idea of rights and relationship this way: “[Private]
property [i]s a claim that other people ought to accede to the will of
the owner, which can be a person, a group, or some other entity. A

72. See STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 22–23 (1990); MARGARET
JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 1 (1993); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 2 (2d ed. 2005); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO
PRIVATE PROPERTY 296 (1990).
73. See JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY
2–3 (2000).
74. Id. at 2.
75. See, e.g., Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U.
TORONTO L.J. 275, 278 (2008).
76. For a discussion of the liberal choice of life projects and property, see Babie,
Choices That Matter, supra note 69, at 333–36.
77. See HOHFELD supra note 67, at 65–67.
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specific property right amounts to the decisionmaking authority of the
holder of that right.”78
Property, then, through this understanding of its relational
foundations, is not merely about the control and use of goods and
resources, but also, significantly, about controlling the lives of
others.79 Using evocative and graphic language, Roberto Mangabera
Unger puts it this way:
[T]he right [choice] is a loaded gun that the rightholder [the
holder of choice] may shoot at will in his corner of town.
Outside that corner the other licensed gunmen may shoot him
down. But the give-and-take of communal life and its
characteristic concern for the actual effect of any decision upon
the other person are incompatible with this view of right[.]80
Identifying the importance of relationship in this way reveals the fact
that property and nonproperty rights overlap. Choices made by those
with property rights have the potential to create negative outcomes—
consequences, or what economists call “externalities”—for those
without property rights. At the highest level of generality, Unger’s
“gunman” is vested with absolute discretion to “[an] absolute claim to
a divisible portion of social capital” and “[i]n this zone the rightholder
[can] avoid any tangle of claims to mutual responsibility.”81 The
individual revels in “a zone of unchecked discretionary action that
others, whether private citizens or governmental officials, may not
invade.”82
Every legal system acknowledges this problem and, in doing so,
seems to accept that with rights come obligations towards others.83
The state, through law, creates property just as through that same law
(what is more commonly known as regulation) it is said to mediate
the socially contingent boundary between property and nonproperty
holders.84 This is the essence of property—state conferral of selfseeking, preference-satisfying, or agenda-setting rights.85 More
78. C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty,
134 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 742–43 (1986).
79. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 13 (1927).
80. ROBERTO M. UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 36 (1986).
81. Id. at 37–38.
82. Id. at 38.
83. See Joseph William Singer, How Property Norms Construct the Externalities of
Ownership, in PROPERTY AND COMMUNITY 57–60 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M.
Peñalver eds., 2010) (discussing the widespread recognition that an individual’s use of
property is “socially situated” and “affects the legitimate interests” of others).
84. Id. at 75–76.
85. See SINGER, supra note 73, at 204.
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succinctly, property is choice—choice about one’s self and one’s
chosen life project.
Yet more lurks below the surface of what appears to be state
control aimed at preventing harm to others. Private property in fact
confers what Duncan Kennedy calls “the legal ground rules” that give
permissions to injure others, to cause legalised injury.86 This is
insidious, for
we don’t think of [them] as ground rules at all, by contrast with
ground rules of prohibition. This is Wesley Hohfeld’s insight:
the legal order permits as well as prohibits, in the simpleminded sense that it could prohibit, but judges and legislators
reject demands from those injured that the injurers be
restrained.87
And those ground rules are invisible, in the sense
that when lawmakers do nothing, they appear to have nothing
to do with the outcome. But when one thinks that many other
forms of injury are prohibited, it becomes clear that inaction is
a policy, and that the law is responsible for the outcome, at least
in the abstract sense that the law “could have made it
otherwise.”88
This brings us full circle to the broader liberal theory, with which
we began, for the importance of relationship in understanding private
property reveals an important yet paradoxical dimension of choice. It
is simply this: the freedom that liberalism secures to the individual to
choose a life project means that in the course of doing so, the
individual also chooses the laws, relationships, communities, and so
forth that constitute the political and legal order. In other words, this
analysis reveals three stages of choice: (i) in the province of politics,
where people choose their contexts (through electing representatives,
who enact laws and appoint judges who interpret those laws), which
in turn (ii) defines the scope of one’s rights (or choice), and this leads
(iii) to the institutions that confer, protect, and enforce the choices
that the individual might make (bearing in mind the ground rules of
permission, as well as, the ground rules of prohibition). The three
stages are recursive, for the third leads inexorably to the first, and so
on. Individuals thus choose the regulation of property as much as they

86. DUNCAN KENNEDY, The Stakes of Law, or Hale and Foucault, in SEXY
DRESSING ETC. 90–91 (1993).
87. Id. at 90–91.
88. Id. at 91.
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do the control and use of goods and resources.89 That, in turn, has
consequences for others—if the scope of choice is expanded—then
the impact that those choices might have on others broadens too.
D. The Harm to Others90
When we focus on choice and relationship as being central to the
liberal understanding of property and to the political-regulatory
contexts we choose, we begin to see something that was always there
yet hidden from view. Namely, that the externalities that stem from
the choices permitted by property create many other types of
relationships in which the decisions taken by those said to have
property hold the potential to affect the lives of many others. The
lives of many are, in short, controlled by the choices of a few. This
Section focuses on just one specific, and stark, example of this
process: anthropogenic climate change.
In earlier work, I have referred to climate change as being a
private property problem.91 Let me explain how. While the science is
complex, it is clear that humans, through their choices, drive the
greenhouse effect that heats the earth’s surface.92 Among other
effects, anthropogenic climate change causes drought and
desertification, increased extreme weather events, and the melting of
polar ice (especially in the north) and thus rising seas levels.93 We
might call this the climate change relationship, which is itself
contingent upon the relational understanding of property that
emerges from the liberal conception. Property facilitates the choices
(both human and corporate) about the use of the goods and resources
that produce greenhouse gasses, which in turn drive anthropogenic
climate change.94 That, of course affects others; as Jedediah Purdy
says:

89. I am most grateful to Joseph William Singer for bringing this crucial point to my
attention. See Singer, supra note 83, at 73.
90. This Section is a revised version of two earlier articles: Paul Babie, Climate
Change: Government, Private Property and Individual Action, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL’Y 19 (2011) [hereinafter Babie, Climate Change]; Paul Babie, Private Property: The
Solution or the Source of the Problem?, 2 AMSTERDAM L.F. 17 (2010) [hereinafter Babie,
Private Property], http://ojs.ubvu.vu.nl/alf/article/view/124/231 [https://perma.cc/3/AF7NK4H].
91. Babie, Climate Change, supra note 90, at 19; Babie, Private Property, supra note
90, at 17–20.
92. Babie, Private Property, supra note 90, at 20.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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[Anthropogenic] climate change threatens to become, fairly
literally, the externality that ate the world. The last two
hundred years of economic growth have been not just a
preference-satisfaction machine but an externality machine,
churning out greenhouse gases that cost polluters nothing and
disperse through the atmosphere to affect the whole globe.95
Our choices about goods and resources cover the gamut of our
chosen life projects, including, but not limited to: where we live, what
we do there, and how we travel from place to place. Corporate
choices are equally important, for they structure the range of choice
available to individuals in setting their own agendas, ultimately giving
corporations the power to broaden or restrict the meaning of private
property in the hands of individuals. Green energy (solar or wind
power), for instance, remains unavailable to the individual consumer
if no corporate energy provider is willing to produce it.96
Even more troubling is the fact that the externalities of climate
change do not end at the borders, physical or legal, of the state that
has conferred property over a good or resource. Rather, choices occur
within a web of relationships, not only legal and social, but also
physical and spatial. Who is affected? Everyone, the world over, with
the poor and disadvantaged of the developing world
disproportionately bearing the brunt of the negative externalities of
climate change,97 which include decreasing security, shortages of food,
increased health problems, and greater stress on available water
supplies.98
The modern liberal conception of property, supported
historically by Magna Carta, through securing choice about the use of
goods and resources to those in the developed world, makes possible
climate change and many more global, national, and local problems
like it . Yet the Supreme Court’s story of Magna Carta’s legacy for
property—which seems so straightforward and natural, “extolling [as
it does] individualism, private property, laissez-faire and English
95. JEDEDIAH PURDY, A TOLERABLE ANARCHY: REBELS, REACTIONARIES, AND
THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 187 (2009) [hereinafter PURDY, A TOLERABLE
ANARCHY]; see also Jedediah Purdy, Climate Change and the Limits of the Possible, 18
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 289, 292 (2008).
96. Babie, Private Property, supra note 90, at 21.
97. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 12 (Martin Parry et al. eds., 2007),
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4_wg2_full_report.pdf [https://perma
.cc/BJM3-TRZL].
98. See Babie, Choices that Matter, supra note 69, at 336–37; Babie, Idea, Sovereignty,
Eco-colonialism, and the Future, supra note 69, at 535.
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civilization”—is “nothing more than a “whitewash.”99 The
individualist-absolutist story whitewashes the Forest Charter’s story
of property, which includes community and obligation as a balance to
the individual and rights. It whitewashes, in short, the full story of
Magna Carta’s legacy for property. It matters, then, that we hear
again the story of obligation and community crystallized in the Forest
Charter’s story.
II. THE SECOND STORY OF PROPERTY: FOREST CHARTER AS
COMMUNITY AND OBLIGATION
The Forest Charter represented an attempt to redress the
inequities of forest law, a body of law that had grown up around those
areas of England known as royal forest.100 Those origins of the royal
forest are found in the Norman Conquest of 1066. Understanding the
Forest Charter’s story of property emerges from its modification of
the royal forest and its law.
A. The Royal Forest and Forest Law
The Norman Conquest of 1066 brought with it the application of
the Norman system of forests to the new English kingdom.101 This
system involved setting aside large tracts of land as royal forest, in
turn subjecting that territory to forest law, a body of law distinct from,
and at one time rivaling in size and complexity, the common law.102
But the term forest law belied its true extent and meaning. As to the
former, the royal forest comprised not only heavily wooded areas
otherwise uninhabited, but also a range of land types that included
cultivated103 and “inhabited countryside with villages and
farmland.”104 In relation to both types of land “the King enjoyed a
monopoly over all management and distribution of resources.”105
Moreover, while the king did not “own” the royal forest per se—
subjects could still own land within the royal forest—any
countervailing rights remained subject to the onerous restrictions of
forest law.106 As the population of medieval England grew, those
99. LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 216.
100. CARPENTER, supra note 7, at 176–79.
101. RAYMOND GRANT, THE ROYAL FORESTS OF ENGLAND 3 (1991).
102. Id. at 5–7.
103. Nicholas A. Robinson, The Charter of the Forest: Evolving Human Rights in
Nature, in MAGNA CARTA AND THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, at 311, 325–26.
104. CAROLYN HARRIS, MAGNA CARTA AND ITS GIFTS TO CANADA: DEMOCRACY,
LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 24 (2015).
105. Id.
106. CARPENTER, supra note 7, at 176–79.
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restrictions “became increasingly onerous to both the nobility and
their peasant tenants who were unable to develop or expand their
land without the King’s permission.”107
The purpose of the forest law was much narrower than the extent
of the royal forest: the protection of the king’s hunting ground108 and
the preservation of food and shelter for the game of the forest for the
king’s hunt.109 Before forest law, “the hunting rights of the King did
not differ materially from those of any other landowner . . . .”110 With
the establishment of the new royal forest, though, forest law
superseded the common law of property, forbidding all but the king
to hunt many animals of the forest, including deer, boar, hares and
rabbits, wildfowl and birds, and fish.111 Moreover, the forest law
forbade subjects from accessing the vegetation of the forest and
restricted cultivation of the land for crops, the collection of wood for
fuel and building, and the pasturing of animals.112
Thus, pursuant to forest law, the death of a beast of the royal
forest at the hands of any person other than the king, members of his
hunting parties, or his foresters was treated with all the seriousness
that we might find today in indictable criminal offences.113 Indeed, the
forest law meted out heavy penalties for violators.114 As the AngloSaxon Chronicle recorded:
[King William I] made many deer-parks; and he established
laws therewith; so that whosoever slew a hart, or a hind, should
be deprived of his eyesight. As he forbade men to kill the harts,
so also the boars . . . His rich men bemoaned it, and the poor
men shuddered at it.115
And Carolyn Harris writes:
The chronicler William of Newburgh complained of William I’s
youngest son, King Henry I, “He was, also, immoderately
attached to beasts of chase, and, from his ardent love of
hunting, used little discrimination in his public punishments
107. Carolyn Harris, The Charter of the Forest, MAGNA CARTA CAN. (Dec. 17, 2013),
http://www.magnacartacanada.ca/the-charter-of-the-forest/ [https://perma.cc/R7YP-NRA8].
108. GRANT, supra note 101, at 6.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 8.
111. See HARRIS, supra note 104, at 24.
112. GRANT, supra note 101, at 6.
113. Id. at 13, 49–50.
114. See HARRIS, supra note 104, at 24 (noting that the punishment for killing a deer
included “blinding and mutilation”).
115. THE ANGLO-SAXON CHRONICLE 166–67 (Ernest Rhys ed., Rev. James Ingram
trans., J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd. 1938).
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between deer killers and murderers.” By the reign of King
Richard the Lionhearted, the punishment for killing a deer was
blinding and mutilation even though the King only spent a few
months in England over the course of his reign and had little
time for hunting between his military campaigns.116
The king’s royal foresters enforced the forest law, wielding powers
both extensive and arbitrary. Thus,
[p]ermission from the king’s chief forester was required before
forest land could be cleared and cultivated, and the king
received rent in perpetuity for these newly developed tracts.
The right to pasture animals in the forest was strictly controlled
and could be revoked at the king’s discretion. Farmers could
only chop down trees for their own use if the removal of a tree
did not create waste, which was defined in the reign of Henry II
as “If a man standing on the stump of an oak or other tree can
see five other trees cut down around him.”117
And most significantly, if the chief forester could not identify an
individual offender, the power existed simply to impose a fine on the
entire community.118
From the king’s perspective, of course, all of this was perfectly
logical: the taking of fines for forest offences produced significant
royal revenue.119 Indeed, David Carpenter concludes: “[Forest law’s]
main purpose was not to provide kings with areas for hunting,
although they certainly were great huntsmen. It was to provide them
with money.”120
It is not surprising, then, that the upper classes considered the
forest law to be more than a mere inconvenience. Not only did it
restrict the hunting rights of the nobility, allowing for the imposition
of fines upon them for the slightest violation, but it also crippled poor
commoners by removing their access to the wild resources that they
relied on for survival.121 At best, the king’s subjects came to see forest
law as an invasion of natural rights; at worst, it was “an unmitigated
disaster[.]”122 In 1159 John of Salisbury wrote that the kings “[i]n their
audacity . . . have dared to claim for themselves animals which are

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Harris, supra note 107.
HARRIS, supra note 104, at 24.
Id.
See CARPENTER, supra note 7, at 176–77; see also GRANT, supra note 101, at 17.
See CARPENTER, supra note 7, at 176–77; see also HARRIS, supra note 104, at 24.
GRANT, supra note 101, at 13.
CARPENTER, supra note 7, at 177.
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wild by nature and are made by right for those who can take them.”123
In short, the forest law “had no benefits for [the king’s subjects].”124
Still, notwithstanding its lack of support, subsequent Norman
kings expanded the royal forest to the extent that by 1215 fully onethird of England was royal forest.125 Such was the perceived injustice
of forest law, then, that it was featured in the original 1215 Magna
Carta. Buried beneath the much-lauded clauses sanctifying
property,126 the 1215 Magna Carta also promised to overhaul the
restrictions imposed in the royal forests by restoring rights in
commons.127 King John promised the disafforesting of any land he
himself had reserved128 to restore the land to public usage and to
investigate and abolish the “evil customs” of the forests.129
But the 1215 Magna Carta was short-lived—in August 1215 Pope
Innocent III annulled the Charter sealed at Runnymede only two
months earlier.130 While it was reissued under subsequent kings,
including Henry III in 1216, 1217, and 1225, the forest chapters were
omitted from Magna Carta. Instead, these chapters took the form of
an expanded and detailed document regulating the uses of the king’s
forests: the Forest Charter.131 And so it is here that the communityobligation story of property begins.
B.

The Community-Obligation Story132

With the reasons for its sealing understood, we can ask: if the
liberal conception of property is supported by the individualist-

123. GRANT, supra note 101, at 16.
124. CARPENTER, supra note 7, at 177.
125. Harris, supra note 107.
126. MAGNA CARTA chs. 21, 28, 39 (1225), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER,
supra note 7, at 47–50, 52–53.
127. MAGNA CARTA ch. 48 (1215), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note
7, at 54–57.
128. MAGNA CARTA ch. 47 (1215), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note
7, at 54–55.
129. MAGNA CARTA ch. 48 (1215), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note
7, at 54–57 (“All evil customs of forests and warrens, and of foresters and warreners,
sheriffs and their ministers, riverbanks and their keepers, are to be immediately inquired
into in each county by twelve sworn knights of the county, who are to be elected by
upright men of the same county, and within forty days after the inquiry has been made,
they are to be wholly abolished by them, so that they are never revived, provided that we,
or our justiciar, if we are not in England, know about it beforehand.”).
130. Robinson, supra note 103, at 335.
131. CHARLES YOUNG, THE ROYAL FORESTS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 64–67 (1979).
132. For a detailed history of the Forest Charter, see generally Robinson, supra note
103, at 331–51. For a concise history of the Forest Charter, see generally Harris, supra note
107; see also HARRIS, supra note 104.
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absolutist story of Magna Carta, what can the Forest Charter add? In
short: community and obligation. Or, put another way, if Magna
Carta offers the notion of the individual and rights as the foundation
of property, the Forest Charter balances that with community and
obligation. The key to unlocking this story of community and
obligation lies in the medieval “notion of having all things common,”
which was “made plausible by the network of customary rights and
practice on common lands, which already by the thirteenth century
was both old and endangered.”133 One simply cannot understand the
Forest Charter’s story of property without first understanding
thirteenth-century commons. These commons not only operated long
before the Forest Charter, but were also jeopardized by the
introduction of forest law.
In those areas treated as commons, the practice of “commoning”
allowed commoners freely to acquire resources from land that they
did not own.134 Thus, for instance, in medieval society some natural
resources were treated as available to all persons, regardless of whose
land the resources grew or fell on.135 Among the resources
commoners could freely acquire were wood, fish, birds, small animals,
and plants.136 In some wooded commons, the “soil belonged to the
lord while grazing belonged to the commoners, and the trees to
either—timber to the lord, and wood to commoners.”137
When much of England was afforested, or converted to royal
forest following the Norman Conquest, commoners not only lost
many of their land rights to commons but were also subject to fines
for exercising their customary rights.138 The arbitrary and capricious
powers wielded by the foresters were, though, eroded prior to the
Forest Charter through agreements entered into by Kings Richard
and John “to ‘disafforest’ land upon the payment of a large sum from
a community whose members agreed they would be better off without
the restrictions imposed on forest dwellers.”139 The process continued
with chapters 47 and 48 of Magna Carta, which, as we have seen,
referred to the “evil customs of forest [law]” and both disafforested
land (or removed lands from royal jurisdiction, which would
133. LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 25–26.
134. See M. JOHN MANWOOD, A TREATISE OF THE LAWES OF THE FOREST 98–105
(photo. reprint 2003) (1616); NAT. ENG., TRENDS IN PASTORAL COMMONING 7 (2009),
http://publications.naturalengland.org.uk/file/65073 [http://perma.cc/H6CA-69BD].
135. See MANWOOD, supra note 134, at 98–105.
136. See LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 42–44.
137. Id. at 33.
138. YOUNG, supra note 131, at 12–15.
139. Harris, supra note 107.
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otherwise prevent access and use by anyone other than the Crown)
and returned to the people the common rights of the forest.140
The Forest Charter, sealed by the young Henry III in 1217,
sought to complete the reversal of the deprivation of resources begun
in 1066.141 To achieve this, first, the Forest Charter extended the
modifications of earlier agreements and Magna Carta by defining the
“evil customs” mentioned in chapter 47. Second, it restricted the royal
prerogatives vested in the chief forester to “extract payments for land
development or levy fines for violations of forest law.”142 It further
restricted these powers by enunciating significant commoning
rights.143 Most importantly, chapter 17 (chapter 16 of the Forest
Charter of 1225) provided that the “liberties of the forest . . . are
granted to . . . everyone”—unlike Magna Carta, which largely applied
to only barons and knights.144
The Forest Charter’s great innovation, then, was to extend the
pre-1217 agreements between individual communities and the Crown
to the entire kingdom. In turn, this restricted the use of royal forest as
purely revenue producing, thereby opening a new means of managing
common resources. This new system placed the community, and not
the personal prerogative of the Crown, at the center of land
ownership. In short, the Forest Charter elevated the place of
community relative to the Crown.
The Forest Charter’s specific provisions, therefore, set out the
framework of community and obligation that became its legacy for
property. Chapters 1 and 3 assured the rights of common to those
who had been accustomed to them, even in the king’s forests.145 These
chapters also disafforested vast tracts of land, thus removing them
from the regulation of forest law.146 These chapters had the effect of

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. CHARTER OF THE FOREST chs. 14, 15 (1217), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND
THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, app. H at 423 (Daniel B. Magraw et al. eds., 2014)
(explaining that every freeman will be able to have his own woods and resources).
144. CHARTER OF THE FOREST ch. 17 (1217), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE
RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, app. H at 423; see also HARRIS, supra note 104, at 50;
Robinson, supra note 103, at 343; cf. GEORGE C. HOMANS, ENGLISH VILLAGERS OF THE
THIRTEENTH CENTURY 64 (1941) (describing a “scene characteristically medieval: the
neatherds of a village sitting at their meal under a hedge in the fields and encountering a
party of huntsmen who have been making free with the king’s deer.”).
145. CHARTER OF THE FOREST chs. 1, 3 (1217), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE
RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, app. H at 421.
146. CHARTER OF THE FOREST chs. 1, 3 (1217), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE
RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, app. H at 421.
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limiting the arbitrary prerogative power of the Crown to convert land
into royal forest, which had so angered the barons.147
Other chapters protected animals and goods. For example,
chapter 7 forbade royal officials (foresters) from taking produce in
lieu of feudal tax.148 Chapter 9 assured common rights to graze
animals.149 Chapter 10, while acknowledging that deer remained the
property of the king, provided that “no one shall henceforth lose life
or limb because of our venison.”150 Further, chapter 12 allowed
persons living in the forest to “make in his own wood, or on his land,
or on his water, which he has within our forest, mills, springs, pools,
marlpits, dykes, or arable ground, without enclosing that arable
ground, so that it be not to the annoyance of any of his neighbours.”151
No longer answerable to the authorities and king for development of
the land, this chapter especially represented a significant freedom to
use land for the good of the commoners and community, taking
account of others in the choices made about one’s land. In this one
chapter, the Forest Charter both revoked unpopular decrees made by
King John and transferred authority over forest development from
king to subject. Put another way, in requiring the consent of one’s
neighbor in the development of land, the emphasis of land ownership
moved from the arbitrary, and often capricious, whim of an individual
(the king)152 to one’s community. Thus, “[i]nstead of answering to the
King alone, forest dwellers had to consult with their communities,
[thus] ensuring that any development did not disadvantage their
neighbours.”153
147. See Harris, supra note 107.
148. CHARTER OF THE FOREST ch. 7 (1217), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE
RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, app. H at 421.
149. CHARTER OF THE FOREST ch. 9 (1217), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE
RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, app. H at 422.
150. CHARTER OF THE FOREST ch. 9 (1217), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE
RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, app. H at 422.
151. CHARTER OF THE FOREST ch. 9 (1217), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE
RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, app. H at 422.
152. And there is no lack of evidence of just how arbitrary and capricious this whim
might be. See HARRIS, supra note 104, at 24 (“In 1209, the knight Roger de Crammaville
of Kent was fined twenty marks for owning dogs that did not meet forest regulations,
which dictated that three claws of their forepaws be removed to ensure that they were
unable to hunt game. That same year, John ordered the destruction of unauthorized
ditches and hedges on forest land. This decree resulted in wild animals—including deer,
which had little fear of humans because of the harsh poaching laws—destroying crops in
fields unprotected by hedges or ditches. In addition to collective fines and other payments,
John also used his forest prerogatives to settle personal scores. In 1200, he expressed his
displeasure with the Cistercian Order by forbidding the monks from pasturing their
livestock in the forest until twelve abbots begged his forgiveness on their knees.”).
153. Id. at 50–51.
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Further, chapter 13 ensured that “[e]very freeman shall have,
within his own woods, ayries of hawkes, sparrow-hawkes, falcons,
eagles and herons: and shall have also the honey that is found within
his woods,” while chapter 14 protected the subjects’ right to gather up
to a certain amount of wood, bark or charcoal without having to pay
the fee of chiminage (a road tax).154
In the totality of the Forest Charter’s provisions, some of which
remained in force for over 700 years,155 we find the core of the
community-obligation story of property which emerges from the
Forest Charter. Concern for the community arrives in the return of
commoning rights that had been lost through the process of
afforestation following the Norman Conquest.156 The return of these
rights and the corresponding return of control to individuals illustrate
the Forest Charter’s concept of obligation to community members.
As we know, Magna Carta had already begun the process of
transforming the royal forest into commoning land in 1215. This
transformation was achieved through chapter 47’s abolition of the
“evil customs” of the royal forests.157 And, while chapter 47 was
removed from subsequent reissues of Magna Carta, that was possible
only because the Forest Charter expanded and developed the
provisions relating to the use of royal forest. That expansion involved
placing at least some of the power over determining how land would
be used in the hands of the community, thus transforming forest law
into a common law that required a consideration of the other in the
choices made about land use, ultimately serving the needs of the
community rather than the Crown alone.
There is little doubt that the Forest Charter’s story of
community-obligation became, rather quickly, an integral part of
understanding Magna Carta’s legacy for property.158 It was soon
impossible to understand the story told by one of these documents
without listening also to the story told by the other. Yet, at some
point in the last eight hundred years, the Forest Charter’s story was
silenced, leaving the legacy of Magna Carta for property
154. CHARTER OF THE FOREST ch. 14 (1217), translated in MAGNA CARTA AND THE
RULE OF LAW, supra note 11, app. H at 423; LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 42.
155. See Harris, supra note 107.
156. See HARRIS, supra note 104, at 50.
157. MAGNA CARTA ch. 47 (1215), reprinted and translated in CARPENTER, supra note
7, at 54–57.
158. HOLT, supra note 10, at 385–86 (“Indeed the repeated demand for afforestation
was one of the main reasons for the periodical confirmation of the Charters from 1225 on
to the end of the reign of Edward I. The Forest Charter and the particular issue
disafforestation helped to keep Magna Carta alive.”).
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impoverished, said to support only the liberal individualist-absolutist
conception of property, rather than its original, relational view.
C.

Magna Carta’s Lost Sister159

From the perspective of its contemporaries, the Forest Charter
did not so much restore individual property rights to landowners as it
restored common property rights to all inhabitants of the forests.160 It
“expanded on [Magna Carta]’s provisions and provided the
foundation for the modern concept of common stewardship of
resources.”161 Indeed, while Magna Carta may be the first selfconscious association of rights and freedoms, in fact, the Forest
Charter may have provided commoners with their earliest sense of
holding such rights and freedoms162:
Crucially, both charters began to explicitly connect commons
with an expansive and political sense of rights and freedom.
The Forest Charter concluded with the statement, “And these
Liberties of the Forests, we have granted to all Men.” This
expressed, at an early date, the association of commons with
freedom. It is significant in this regard that together the
documents were called the Charters of Liberties.163
Yet, there was real doubt whether the Forest Charter would even
endure. In 1227, when Henry III came of age, it was unclear whether
any of the charters approved during his minority would be valid upon
his attaining the age of majority.164 Yet,
[t]he King ultimately agreed to uphold Magna Carta in
exchange for a tax on the movable property of the clergy, and
the Charter of the Forest for a tax on land. Henry III’s fifty-six
year reign coincided with a period of prosperity for England as
land development in rural areas matched the needs of
communities instead of forest regulations imposed on them by
the King.165

159. This phrase is derived from Geraldine van Bueren, Letter to the Editor: Charter’s
Lost Sister, TIMES (June 18, 2014), http://thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/letters/article4122090
.ece [https://perma.cc/F6G6-JL8Z].
160. See Robinson, supra note 103, at 317–18.
161. Harris, supra note 107.
162. Ben Maddison, Radical Commons Discourse and the Challenges of Colonialism,
108 RADICAL HIST. REV. 29, 32 (2010).
163. Id.
164. Harris, supra note 107.
165. Id.
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Notwithstanding Henry’s agreement to be bound by Magna Carta and
the Forest Charter, it would be several centuries before commoners
generally begun to understand commoning as necessary to be asserted
and defended.166 This took the form of acts of resistance against
enclosure and the “gradual popular transcendence of the ideas about
common rights articulated in the charters.”167 And once this process
of transcendence began, the Forest Charter came to foster beliefs that
commons, and not private property, are the vehicle of freedom.168
Thus, in their early history, Magna Carta and the Forest Charter
came to be seen as equally important. Each time a king reissued
Magna Carta, the Charter of the Forest was reissued as well.169 In
1225 both charters were issued together in what became their
definitive form.170 They were again confirmed when Henry III
reached his majority in 1227.171 By 1297, Edward I directed that the
charters would be the common law of England172 and ordered that
both be read aloud in each cathedral twice annually.173 And so, in
1642, Sir Edward Coke wrote:
It is called Magna Charta, not that it is great in quantity, for
there be many voluminous charters commonly passed, specially
in these later times, longer than this is; nor comparatively in
respect that it is greater than Charta de Foresta, but in respect
of the great importance, and weightiness of the matter, as
hereafter shall appeare: and likewise for the same cause Charta
de Foresta is called Magna Charta de Foresta, and both of them
are called Magnae Chartae Libertatum Angliae [great charters
of English liberties].174
Therefore, when told together, as they were always intended to be
told, Magna Carta and the Forest Charter tell a very different story
about property than the one told by the U.S. Supreme Court, a story
166. See Maddison, supra note 162, at 33.
167. Id.; see also Robinson, supra note 103, at 338 (noting that the Forest Charter
engendered this knowledge as a consequence of orders that both Charters were to be read
aloud in each Cathedral twice a year).
168. Maddison, supra note 162, at 33.
169. Robinson, supra note 103, at 337. The many reissues of the Charters, and
consequent reaffirming of the rights contained therein, were usually in exchange for
financial support to the King. Id.
170. Id. at 313–14.
171. Id. at 317 n.25.
172. LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 39.
173. Robinson, supra note 103, at 338. But see LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 38 (stating
that the frequency is four times per year).
174. SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, at Proeme *A4
(1642), quoted in LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 38.
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that carefully balances a system of individualist-absolutist property
with obligation towards the community. But, at some point after 1642
the Forest Charter drops out of the popular social imagination and
falls into desuetude. When precisely and why exactly we cannot say.
What we do know is that the Forest Charter is found in Sir William
Blackstone’s definitive version of the two Great Charters produced in
1759,175 so as late as the eighteenth century the second story of
property remained extant. What happened? Was the fate of the
Forest Charter’s lasting image sealed by its seemingly archaic
terminology and concepts? Some think so:
Historians have always known the Charter of the Forest existed
but many of its terms—for example, estovers, or subsistence
wood products—seem strange and archaic, and have prevented
the general public from recognizing its existence and
understanding its importance.176
Or is there a connection to the dispossession of the indigenous
peoples of North America, the only commoners by practice in the
New World? That is speculative, but we do know that at the same
time indigenous peoples were being dispossessed, liberty and freedom
were being extolled as the virtues of the liberal individual and were
central to the American conception of the relationship of people to
one another and to government.177 So it may be that liberalism itself
stripped away this memory of the Forest Charter as being
community-obligation focused, burnishing in its place Magna Carta’s
image of liberty achieved by unrestricted private property rights. In
contrast, the Forest Charter saw liberty as being associated with
freedom and rights intrinsic to the concept of commons.178
Or the silencing may have been more recent. Examples of
meaningful representations of rights of commons and the Forest
Charter can be found in the activities of the “Diggers,”179 a political
175.
176.
177.
178.

See Wilfrid Prest, Blackstone’s Magna Carta, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2016).
LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 6 (citation omitted).
Id. at 171–72.
Chris Besant, From Forest to Field: A Brief History of Environmental Law, 16
LEGAL SERV. BULL. 160, 162 (1991).
179. A group of Protestant radicals known as the “Diggers” are sometimes seen as
forerunners to modern anarchism and also associated with agrarian socialism. See Nicolas
Walter, Anarchism and Religion 1, 2–3 (1991), http://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/nicolas
-walter-anarchism-and-religion.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RAB-PW8G]. They are also
associated with agrarian communism. See THE BRITANNICA GUIDE TO POLITICAL
SCIENCE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS THAT CHANGED THE MODERN WORLD 129
(Heather M. Campbell ed., 2009). Originally known as the True Levellers in 1649, and led
by Gerrard Winstanley, their attempts to farm on common land resulted in them being
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group in civil-war era England, in colonial America and Australia,
and even up to the 1890s in Australia.180 Such representations make
clear that, notwithstanding Magna Carta’s story of property as told by
the Supreme Court, the notion of commoning and its corresponding
concept of obligation, may not, on closer scrutiny, be all that archaic
to the modern mind.
Still, archaic or not, freedom enhancing or not, the communityobligation story of property told by the Forest Charter has seldom, if
ever, been heard in our time.181 Chris Besant argues that “these two
documents standing side by side express a central theme in English
history that is not adequately recognized by a tradition of inquiry that
treats one document [Magna Carta] as fundamental, and [the Forest
Charter] as of antiquarian interest.”182 Whatever the truth, and we
may never know why or how the Forest Charter’s story was silenced,
sometime between 1759 and today, the Forest Charter became Magna
Carta’s “lost sister.”183
We need to retell the story using concepts relevant to our own
time. The next Section offers some concluding reflections on how we
might do that, again using the contemporary challenge of
anthropogenic climate change as a means of exploring what the
Forest Charter story of community-obligation might say to us.

referred to as the Diggers. See id. The Diggers were so radical, that for Winstanley, “while
they might have originated in the Charters of Liberties, the laws derived from the Magna
Carta [and the Forest Charter] . . . were ‘yokes and manacles, tying one sort of people to
be slaves to another[.]’ ” Maddison, supra note 162, at 37. This was a radical view for the
time, contrasting the moderate popular view of commons rights as freedoms connected to
customary rights on specific land. Id. at 38.
180. Maddison, supra note 162, at 34–41. But see LINEBAUGH, supra note 9, at 72
(arguing that our collective forgetfulness may have started in the seventeenth century). In
any case, the Forest Charter disappeared as part of Magna Carta’s legacy sometime
between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries.
181. Robinson, supra note 103, at 314 (“[K]nowledge of Magna Carta has eclipsed
memory of [the Forest Charter].”).
182. Besant, supra note 178, at 160.
183. Van Bueren, supra note 159.
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III. REFLECTIONS: THE FOREST CHARTER’S COMMUNITYOBLIGATION STORY FOR OUR OWN TIME

Figure 2. Green Man184
A. A New Metaphor
You may have passed over it without a second thought. Quite
intentionally, without comment, I wanted at the outset of this Article
for the reader to see an image of a medieval forest—perhaps it was a
forest where the right of commoning existed, or perhaps it was the
royal forest, where such rights had been lost. What was lost or when it
was lost does not really matter; all that matters is the visual
representation of lands as they might have been at the time of Magna
Carta, either before being afforested or after being disafforested. In
184. Green Man (Thirteenth Century), Bamberg Cathedral, Germany. © 1992 Clive
Hicks (reproduced with permission).
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short, the image of the medieval forest captures, at least partially,
Magna Carta’s legacy for property centered, one way or another, in
the individualist-absolutist story.
We have heard this individualist-absolutist story told repeatedly
over a very long time: property as choice structured to suit the
interests and preferences of the individual, with that power of choice
and control protected against all others, including the sovereign. It
has become, more than anything else, a metaphor for the liberal
conception of property; the same conception that the Supreme Court
adverts to and relies upon again and again, just as Chief Justice
Roberts did most recently in Horne.185 The image of the medieval
forest represents, visually, that metaphor. But while romantic, that
image is misleading and false.
The metaphor of Magna Carta as individualist-absolutist
property is misleading and false because it represents only half the
story—the other half is told by the Great Charter’s lost sister, the
Forest Charter. Without the Forest Charter’s story, a necessary
dimension of the freedom and liberty of property—the obligation
towards others and towards the community—is neglected. The Forest
Charter forces us to find a new metaphor, one that represents the
dual stories of property as both individualist-absolutist and as
community-obligation. This Section suggests replacing the metaphor
in the form of an image that would have been very familiar to Kings
John and Henry III, to the barons who forced their hands,186 and to
most other people alive at the time that those kings set their seals
upon Magna Carta and the Forest Charter: it is the image of the
Green Man.
We scarcely hear of the Green Man today, but in medieval times
the Green Man was found in churches and public buildings.187 The
careful observer can still see some of the surviving Green Men in
European churches and public buildings today.188 So what is the
Green Man? To begin, the Green Man is plural, for there is no one
image of the Green Man, but many variants, which can be classed into
185. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015).
186. Robinson, supra note 103, at 318.
187. See generally Lady Raglan, The “Green Man” in Church Architecture, 50
FOLKLORE 45 (1939) (explaining generally the presence of the “Green Man” in church
architecture).
188. GARY R. VARNER, THE MYTHIC FOREST, THE GREEN MAN, AND THE SPIRIT OF
NATURE: THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE SPIRIT OF NATURE FROM ANCIENT TIMES INTO
MODERN SOCIETY 160–65 (2006); Luke Mastin, History of the Green Man, THE ENIGMA
OF THE GREEN MAN (2011), http://www.greenmanenigma.com/history.html [https://perma
.cc/UE93-ZFS7].
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three broad types.189 First, the Green Man of late Roman architecture,
comprising “foliate heads, which were faces actually formed of leaves,
foliate masks—faces composed of leaves.”190 The second appears in
the earliest known Christian example, from the French town of
Poitiers, in which “the face generates the foliage, in this case from the
nose, but later more usually from the mouth, and occasionally from
the ears, and even, grimly, in a few, from the eyes.”191 Finally, in
others “the face is set amongst the foliage, like fruit, and this type
shades away into marginal examples which might just be faces ringed
with decorative leaves.”192 One also finds Green Women and some
green animals.193 An excellent example of the Green Man is that
found in the Bamberg Cathedral in Germany, an image of which
greets us at the start of this Section.
But what is important for present purposes is the fact that the
Green Man is both “an image and an idea. It is an image of a human
face associated with foliage, and it is the idea that makes real the
connection between humanity and nature. The image personifies the
idea.”194 The Green Man captures the idea of both the individual and
the community: “within each human psyche there is that which each
of us feels to be ‘I’, the ego, which is the incarnation of the psyche.
The Green Man is an expression of this.”195 But more than this, “the
consciousness of the individual, set in this mortal vehicle, is the union
of the timeless with time, in a circle of birth, death and renewal. The
Green Man is an expression of this.”196 And so, “the idea of the Green
Man is an Archetype: it is the practical incarnation of the reality that
All is One.”197 The Green Man is a synthesis of individual and
community and of humanity and creation-nature-environment. The
individual cannot be understood as being separate from the
community; humanity cannot be understood as separable from the
environment. They are inseparable; they are one; they are
constitutive of one another; they are a synthesis.
Increasingly, the Green Man as the idea, the archetype, of the
synthesis of individual-community and humanity-environment has
been identified with “seeing the world as a whole in a way that no
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

CLIVE HICKS, THE GREEN MAN: A FIELD GUIDE 1–8 (2000).
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
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previous generation has done, and [which will] demand reforms as a
whole.”198 Thus, the Green Man serves as a “symbol [having] great
value and great potential as a catalyst in the self-revelation of the
community and the self-realisation of the individual, and, arising from
those, the regeneration of nature that we have so damaged.”199 The
synthesis embodied in the Green Man, then, represents a visual
metaphor or archetype of the integration of the individual-community
as humanity within the environment, demonstrating the oneness of
the three.
This visual metaphor of community and obligation serves to
counter, but not to obviate, the metaphor of the individual and rights
found in the image of the medieval forest. The two metaphors are not
and cannot be separate. The “green” of the Green Man comes from
the foliage of the forest, thus linking the two images through our
relationship to the world in which we live. Both individual choice and
obligation towards the community are linked through the subject of
our choices, the tangible and intangible things—the environment in
which we live—that are subject to the concept of property.
In the same way that the individual and the community ought not
be separated but are linked in the visual metaphor of the Green Man,
the two stories of Magna Carta’s legacy for property ought not be
read separately. Rather, the two are linked in their common
treatment of property—thus, they must be read together, as they were
intended to be. What might such a reading mean for our own time?
B.

Using the Green Man as a Tool for Reading the Stories Together

How, then, might we read together the two stories of property
emerging from a full reading of Magna Carta’s legacy for property in
our own time? This Section uses the metaphor of the Green Man as a
means of revealing the inseparability of the individual, the
community, and the environment. We have seen that two property
stories emerge from Magna Carta and the Forest Charter; the one
associated with the former supports the individual, while the one
found in the latter reminds us of the community. The Green Man asks
us to read these stories as if they were one; in the same way that the
individual and the community are inseparable, so, too, are the two
stories of property. Thus, reading the two stories together teaches a
very simple lesson: property, while comprising the power of choice to
suit one’s own personal preferences and interests, must do more than
198. Id. at 11.
199. Id. at ix.
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simply serve the needs of one person—the king at the time of Magna
Carta, the individual in modern liberal vernacular. Property must
also, in addition to its individualist-absolutist leanings, serve the needs
of the community, the members of which, by right, share in the
control and use of the resources required to survive. Community is, in
short, central to what property is.
And, as we have seen, with the recognition of community comes
obligation. The right to commons is the core of the Forest Charter’s
emphasis on obligation, which is something that might seem radical if
all we can hear is Magna Carta telling us that property is individualistabsolutist. But if we allow ourselves to think that way, we must
remember that any feeling of radicalism we might have in recognizing
obligation as central to property comes only as a consequence of
failing to understand the dual importance of Magna Carta and the
Forest Charter. But that is to be expected when the second story, that
of community and obligation, has been so fully silenced for so long.
Having then recognized that the two stories are indispensable,
that community and obligation form part of the core of freedom and
liberty, we can see that property today, as in King John and King
Henry III’s day, must serve the general welfare:
Although the state may come into being to protect private
property, a strong case exists that property serves the general
welfare or common good and that individual ownership in our
nation is not an end in itself but the way society gives incentive
to the resource creation that establishes maximum conditions
for benefiting society. The American republic does not exist to
protect the individual owner as resource solipsist but to protect
all owners in their common interest, in short, to protect the
general welfare.200
The Forest Charter provides us with both an old and a new story of
property, one which supplements, but does not replace, the
individualist-absolutist one we have heard for so long in Magna Carta.
Leaving them apart impoverishes both documents. Read together,
“[t]he lasting legacy of the Charter of the Forest is the precedent for
community stewardship of shared resources that endures into the
twenty-first century.”201 When read as one, Magna Carta and the
Forest Charter tell a story of property (what we now call the liberal

200. O. Lee Reed & E. Clayton Hipp, A “Commonest” Manifesto: Property and the
General Welfare, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 103, 105 (2009).
201. Harris, supra note 107.
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conception (read: individualist-absolutist)) as including obligation
towards the community.
What might this mean in the context of the environment and
climate change? The next and final Section offers three reflections in
answer to this question by considering the potential of the Forest
Charter’s story of property as community-obligation in order to
balance the individualist-absolutist story that allows the choices
driving anthropogenic climate change.
C.

Community-Obligation and Anthropogenic Climate Change

Once we begin to see community as central to the choices that
are made by the individual pursuant to private property, then we can
see that obligation may be either self-imposed or imposed by the state
through regulation. In either case, this is a modification of the liberal
conception of property, which otherwise views the state’s role as
protecting the individual’s choices against the predation of others,
including the government; and this story is the one told for Magna
Carta by contemporary American law. Yet the story told of Magna
Carta was clearly not the core of the Forest Charter’s story—the
other half of the joint story of private property told by Magna Carta
and the Forest Charter. To return to the example used earlier,
anthropogenic climate change, it is possible to map out how private
property might change to account for community-obligation, but what
one might hope for can be summarized in three reflections.
First, recognizing community and obligation as part of Magna
Carta’s legacy for property would mean that we recognize how
property, seen as merely individual and rights, allows us to
countenance unequal distributions of power—choice—in the control
and use of resources.202 Those concentrations of power or choice in
the control and use of resources not only result in inequalities within
the state, but also among states, allowing for a small number of
people in a small number of states to negatively affect vast numbers
202. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 1–5, 17–34 (2004). See generally
KENNEDY, supra note 86 (attempting to “analyz[e] the role of law in the reproduction of
social injustice in late capitalist societies”); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and
Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1943) (arguing that a “free” economy through
freedom of contract contains “more coercion, and government and law played a more
significant part, than is generally realized”); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in
a Supposedly Non-coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923) (contending that “systems
advocated by professed upholders of laissez-faire are in reality permeated with coercive
restrictions of individual freedom, and with restrictions, moreover, out of conformity with
any formula of ‘equal opportunity’ or of ‘preserving the equal rights of others’ ”).
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of others beyond those boundaries.203 Climate change, seen through
the lens of an individualist-absolutist conception of property, sets this
failure squarely before us.204 If we are committed to adopting the
Forest Charter as part of Magna Carta’s legacy, we might hope that
the way property is understood would redress this imbalance of
power and therefore take greater account of the externalities of
climate change flowing from those choices that carry with them
extrajurisdictional reach—those that extend beyond boundaries
founded upon ideas of national sovereignty.
Second, and following from the first reflection, the Forest
Charter’s story of community and obligation might lead us to
recognize the only community that truly matters today: the global
community. Climate change is the best indicator of what this global
community might be. Again, there is no doubt that climate change is a
truly global phenomena—it involves global interaction and
interdependence that concerns all humankind.205 The liberal
conception of private property, however—the conception said to be
supported by Magna Carta—rarely explores how such
extrajurisdictional decisions or choices taken by one who holds
private property visit their consequences not only on those within the
jurisdiction that creates and sustains private property (i.e., the state),
but also on those without, forming what we might refer to as an
interjurisdictional community. Viewed in the global context of climate
change, private property begins to look rather asymmetrical.206
What do we mean by “asymmetry?” Simply this: the nature of
choices as matched against the externalities involved in climate
change are not limited by national boundaries, as assumed by the
203. For an amusing example of this blindness, see WILLIAM TWINING,
GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY 59 n.9 (2001), where Twining discusses his
attendance at the 1982 Harvard Critical Legal Studies Conference, where he notes that
one of the failings of Critical Legal Studies was its inward-lookingness. Id. Some modern
theorists are beginning to reveal the flaws in such thinking in the case of domestic
municipal law and public international law. See, e.g., David Kennedy, The Mystery of
Global Governance, in RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 37–39 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds.,
2009); William Twining, Law, Justice and Rights: Some Implications of a Global
Perspective 4 (Jan. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc
/download?doi=10.1.1.486.6007&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/PGZ7-8WCG].
204. For a full assessment of how this is so, see generally Babie, Choices That Matter,
supra note 69.
205. See TWINING, supra note 203, at 3 (defining globalization as “those processes that
increase interaction and interdependence in respect of . . . ecology [and] climate”).
206. This phrase is adapted from the seminal work of David Lametti. See generally
David Lametti, The Concept of Property: Relations Through Objects of Social Wealth, 53
U. TORONTO L.J. 325 (2003) (establishing this concept of asymmetry).
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liberal concept of private property. The effects of choice exercised in
one jurisdiction, the decision to use one form of energy, for instance,
or to drive a car rather than ride a bike, produce greenhouse gases
that drive anthropogenic climate change. Those consequences go
beyond the borders of the jurisdiction that made the choice possible.
In short, private property makes choices possible that have
consequences far beyond the jurisdictional limits of the systems that
created the possibility of such choices.207 Combined with the fact that
the largest holdings of private property are concentrated in
industrialized or industrializing nations—such as the United States
and most Western European nations—and those most vulnerable and
affected by the consequences are those living in the underdeveloped
and third world—such as the South Pacific Island nations208—the farreaching consequences of private property render misguided any
focus on physical borders and national boundaries as capable of
limiting the reach of the effects of private property choices.
Thus, asymmetry refers to the situation that occurs when the
consequences of private property choices are visited on those beyond
the jurisdictional reach of the legal structures that creates, confers,
and protects those choices. This is the case when faced with any
global phenomena; here we merely happen to be concerned with
anthropogenic climate change. Thus, again, if we are committed to
adopting the Forest Charter’s story, we may be willing to see our
community as somewhat larger than we might have once considered
it. In short, it encompasses all people on the planet today.
But yet, there is a third reflection through which we may extend
the notion of community one step further: a model of private
property that takes account of the global consequences of climate
change might also extend the notion of community not only to all
other humans on the planet, but also to the environment as a whole.
In other words, our notion of community might account for what

207. See PURDY, A TOLERABLE ANARCHY, supra note 95, at 187.
208. See generally U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, TABLE 1: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX
AND ITS COMPONENTS, http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI [https://perma.cc/4CFDJ38V] (aggregating data regarding the Human Development Index, a “measure of average
achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being
knowledgeable and hav[ing] a decent standard of living[,]” in 188 countries); James B.
Davies et al., The World Distribution of Household Wealth (World Inst. for Dev. Econ.
Research, Discussion Paper No. 2008/03) (2008), https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default
/files/dp2008-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MJH-ZT6F] (discussing the correlation between
countries that lack adequate “social safety nets” and borrowing and lending opportunities
and those countries with the lowest measures of household wealth).
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William Twining calls an ecocentric focus.209 Anthropocentric actions
are those the reasons for which are the provision of a benefit to
human beings, while ecocentric ones are those for which the reason is
the provision of a benefit to the environment.
Twining argues that while most canonical jurists are not
indifferent to environmental concerns and do not treat ecocentric
reasons as invalid, typically they seem to be anthropocentric in their
focus.210 There is a growing body of scholarship surrounding what has
come to be known as “earth jurisprudence” that supports such claims
about community.211 Of course, there is little doubt that changing the
way we relate to the environment through law would be difficult, but
perhaps it is not impossible.212 Charles Taylor identifies some epochal
moments in human history where political shifts have occurred—the
most notable being “the great founding revolutions of our
contemporary world, the American and the French.”213 In one, the
transition was smooth and less catastrophic because the idealization
of popular sovereignty was easy to connect with an existing practice
of popular election. In the other, however, the inability to translate
the same idealization into a stable and agreed upon set of practices
led to great conflict for over a century.214 Taylor sees such changes as
possible when
people take up, improvise, or are inducted into new practices.
These are made sense of by the new outlook, the one first
articulated in [a] theory; this outlook is the context that gives
sense to the practices. And hence the new understanding comes
to be accessible to the participants in a way it wasn’t before. It
begins to define the contours of their world, and can eventually
come to count as the taken-for-granted shape of things, too
obvious to mention.215
Could the environment in our time be akin to the political
relationships of the American and French revolutions? Perhaps. It is
not impossible to imagine that climate change could become for the
209. TWINING, supra note 203 at 19 (“An ecocentric action is taken to be one in which
the reason to act is the provision of a benefit to the environment[.]” (quoting Bebhinn
Donnelly & Patrick Bishop, Natural Law and Ecocentrism, 19 J. ENVTL. L. 89 (2007))).
210. Id. at 19–20.
211. See EXPLORING WILD LAW: THE PHILOSOPHY OF EARTH JURISPRUDENCE 3–12
(Peter Burdon ed., 2011); WILD LAW: IN PRACTICE 19–28 (Peter Burdon & Michelle
Maloney eds., 2014).
212. See Babie, Choices That Matter, supra note 69, at 349–56.
213. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 175 (2007).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 175–76.
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postmodern world a “revolution” not unlike that witnessed in the
United States and France in the eighteenth century, taking us beyond
the liberalism that emerged from those revolutions. Charles Reich,
writing forty-five years ago in a book seemingly forgotten today, said:
There is a revolution coming. It will not be like revolutions of
the past. It will originate with the individual and with culture,
and it will change the political structure only as its final act. It
will not require violence to succeed, and it cannot be
successfully resisted by violence. It is now spreading with
amazing rapidity, and already our laws, our institutions and
social structure are changing in consequence. It promises a
higher reason, a more human community and a new liberal
individual. Its ultimate creation will be a new and enduring
wholeness and beauty—a renewed relationship of man to
himself, to other men, to society, to nature and to the land.216
While it would be a radical step to advance our notion of
community so far as to include not only humanity, but also the
environment, it would certainly be a step supported by the Forest
Charter, which, it has been said, may very well be one of the first
pieces of environmental legislation, developed to remedy unfair
governance of natural resources.217 Such a conception of the
community would certainly be in keeping then with the spirit of the
Forest Charter’s story of community and obligation. As J. C. Holt
wrote about the legacy of Magna Carta:
Later generations may have differed on what the community
was and on who was entitled to represent it, but they were
rarely in any doubt that authority should be subject to law
which the community itself defined.218
Magna Carta’s legacy is one that includes both the individual and the
community; the Forest Charter comprises an important, but
forgotten, part of that legacy, reminding us that the community plays
a central role in Magna Carta’s conception of individual freedom. The
environment, too, formed a part of the Forest Charter’s conception of
the community good. Just as the Forest Charter’s story of property
cannot be separated from Magna Carta’s, so also its conception of the
community cannot exclude protection of the environment.

216. CHARLES A. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA 4 (1970).
217. Robinson, supra note 103, at 311, 323.
218. HOLT, supra note 10, at 404–05 (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
So, what should we do in two years? The vista of medieval forest
at the outset of this Article reminds us of Magna Carta’s well-known
story of the individual and rights. The gaze of a medieval Green Man
here at the conclusion invites us to listen again to the Forest Charter’s
story of community and obligation. What, then, should we do in 2017?
The answer, I hope, is obvious: we ought to reject what Lord Faulks
said in the House of Lords on June 18, 2015, and we ought to gather
to commemorate the eight hundredth anniversary of a document
every bit as important as Magna Carta—without which Magna Carta’s
story of property is not only incomplete but also misleading.
Just as the Green Man tells us that the individual and the
community are one, so too are Magna Carta and the Forest Charter.
Together, they tell us that we can fully understand property only
when we see the individual within the context of the community. The
eight hundredth anniversary in 2017 of Henry III setting his seal on
Magna Carta’s lost sister seems a good time to hear that story again.

